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According to Abraham Maslow￿ s motivational theory, human action is moti-
vated by ￿ve groups of human needs. The model introduced in this paper exploits
Maslow￿ s theory to explain migration ￿ ows between regions. In the model, move-
ment from one place to another in￿ uences migrant￿ s utility through three various
ways. First, through change in wage caused by di⁄erent wage levels in each
location. Second, through changes in utility connected with individual￿ s safety
needs and ￿nally, through disarrangement of individual￿ s social networks. When
safety and social needs are added to the model, equilibria arise in which wage
di⁄erential between regions persists.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditional way how to explain migration ￿ ows from one region to an-
other is to employ homo oeconomicus and let him compare economic con-
ditions in di⁄erent regions. Massey (1993) introduces following form of the
model2 where rational agent decides according to the expected net return




[Ed(t)Yd(t) ￿ Eh(t)Yh(t)]e￿rtdt ￿ C(0)
where ER(0) is the expected net return to migration calculated just before
departure at time 0. Ed is probability of employment at the destination,
Yd is income in case of employment in destination country. Eh is the
probability of being employed in the country of origin and Yh is income
1Great acknowledgement goes to Petr ￿varc who wrote the program for simulation
model.
2Model presented here is simpli￿ed - possibility of deportation is not taken into
account.
1in case of employment in the country of origin. C(0) is the sum of all
costs that the migrant must bear if he decides to leave home region. An
individual will migrate on condition that ER(0) > 0. For ER(0) < 0 he
will stay in home region and in case that ER(0) = 0, he is indi⁄erent.
The potential migrant goes to the country with the highest ER(0). In
connection with this model Massey writes3:
"Migration occurs until expected earnings (the product of
earnings and employment rates) have been equalized interna-
tionally (net of the costs of movement), and movement does not
stop until this product has been equalized."
Hence for homogenous agents and zero unemployment rates model pre-
dicts wage equalization caused by migration ￿ ows from low-wage countries
to more prosperous ones.
There exists extensive literature that re￿ ects the fact that social ties
and social networks play an important role in migration decision. How-
ever, it usually re￿ ects only networks created in destination areas. In such
case migration networks are seen to help potential migrants to ￿nd jobs,
accommodation and to adapt to new environment. For empirical evidence
see e.g. Pedersen, Pytlikova and Smith (2004), Rotte and Vogler (1998) or
Bauer, Epstein and Gang (2002). An interesting model of network migra-
tion is presented by Heitmueller (2003). Contrary to most authors he argues
that incumbent migrants￿population may actively in￿ uence future migra-
tion ￿ ows, yet the coordination failure causes inability to achieve Pareto
e¢ cient point. Epstein and Gang (2004) examined migration networks
and herd e⁄ects, phenomenons that are caused by imperfect information
available to potential migrants who instead of relying on their own private
information follow signals given by previous migrants.
Our model regards social networks as an important factor in￿ uencing
migration. In contrast to previous models we consider not only social net-
work created in destination but we see individual as part of social network
even in his home region. We base our theoretical model on Maslow￿ s mo-
tivational theory that suggests that wages, social networks and feeling of
stability provided by home region may be key features a⁄ecting migration
decision.
In the next section we describe some empirical ￿ndings that motivated
the development of the model. Third section describes Maslow￿ s theory
of motivation. Section 4 associates motivational theory with migration
behaviour. In section 5 migration models are introduced and section 6
presents results of the simulations. Section 7 concludes.
3Massey (1993) pp. 435
22. MOTIVATION OF THE MODEL
2.1. European experience
It seems that migration ￿ ows especially in Europe are much less inten-
sive and, as concerns migration, people in Europe are less sensitive to wage
and unemployment levels than predicted by economic theory4.
In 2000 only 255,000 people (0.1% of the total EU population) changed
their o¢ cial residence between two countries5. During years 1991 to 2001
a total of 38% of EU citizens changed their residence. 68% of this number
moved within the same town or village and 36% moved to another town in
the same region. 21% moved to another region in the same member state
and only 4.4% moved to another member state6. (See Table 1)
Table 1: Mobility within EU-15 (in %) (Eurobarometer (2001))
Taking into consideration prevailing GDP (see Table 2) and unemployment
gaps (especially on regional level), even moving costs are not able to explain
such reluctance to move.
4e.g. Seija (1998)
5Commission of the European Communities (2002)
6Some people moved more than once within the ten year period.
3Table 2: EU-15 regions with highest and lowest GDP per capita in PPS
(2002) (Eurostat (2005))
The moves across borders connected with the change of residence are at
quite a low level. However, commuting is turning to be increasingly impor-
tant factor of labour mobility across EU borders and is generally the most
frequent form of geographic mobility undertaken by EU citizens (see Table
3).
Table 3: Cross-border commuting in the European Union in 19997
(European Commission (2001))
Altogether 83% of all commuters8 come from only four countries -
France, Germany, Belgium and Italy. Half of all cross-border commuters
7*without 964 commuters between Paris-London
**without 1.270 commuters between Gibraltar and Spain
***data based on company surveys, expert talks, recently published scienti￿c studies
etc.
8included countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Norway,
Switzerland, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino
4originate from France alone. The commuters￿countries of destination are
even more concentrated, with 70.9% commuting to Switzerland, Germany
and Luxembourg.
Low mobility of the European labour force induced European Commis-
sion to support survey9 concerning among others the obstacles of movement
within EU. 11% of survey respondents said that they had thought about
making the move but had given up the idea. The most often quoted reasons
for immobility were family considerations and language barriers. 29% of
respondents said that they have lack of information about the opportuni-
ties and 18% found di¢ cult to ￿nd an appropriate job in another member
state (see Figure 1).
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Concerns about tax implications
Worries that academic qualification will not be recognised
Concerns about administrative formalities
Impossibility to afford life in another member state
No wish to move
Difficulty in finding an appropriate job
Lack of information about the opportunuties
Language barriers
Family consideration
Figure 1: Reasons for giving up the idea of moving to another member
state
According to quoted survey the main reason for giving up the idea to move
to another member states are hindrances related to family life.
We can see that the existence of social ties is crucial factor in migration
decision making. Social ties usually do not considerably in￿ uence person￿ s
everyday decisions concerning consumption, spending or saving. Hence an
individual behaves correspondingly to economic theoretical models. How-
ever, when deciding about migration, social factors importantly in￿ uence
￿nal solution.
2.2. Enlargement of the European Union
Before 2004 enlargement many objections were raised against full intro-
duction of free movement of labour for 10 new countries that actually led
9Internal Market Scoreboard No.11, November 2002
5to the implementation of transitional period. The reasons for this measure










































































































































































































Figure 2: GDP per capita in PPS (2003) (Eurostat - Statistical yearbook
2004)
Comparison of economic indicators (see ￿gure 2) led many people to conclu-
sion that massive immigration wave to EU-15 states is unavoidable. Figure
3 shows regional level of GDP per capita for all 25 EU member states. We
can see that in 2002 there were 6 countries that had regions with GDP
lower than 50% of EU average. All of them were new member states -
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia.
However, latest information does not show signi￿cant intensi￿cation of
migration ￿ ows to countries that did not implement transitional period for
free movement of people. According to OECD (2005) latest available data
for the United Kingdom show that between May and December 2004 there
were in total 133 000 work permit applicants from new member countries.
Of these, nearly 40% were already in the United Kingdom before 1 May
2004.
6Figure 3: GDP per inhabitant in PPS (2002) NUTS 2 level in % of EU-25
average - EU-25 = 100 (Eurostat, Regions:Statistical yearbook 2005)
Similar fears that led to implementation of transitional period for free move-
ment of people were raised prior to southern enlargement in 1981 and 1986.
As well as for eastern enlargement huge migration waves did not occur.
Our model suggests that migration does not arise because the standard
of living in the new member countries is so high that people are not only
concerned in income maximization but also in "social utility" maximiza-
tion. Their utility is also in￿ uenced by social ties they do have and that
would be lost in case of migration into foreign country. Hence, the wage
gap needed to motivate migration is quite large because it must exceed lost
utility from social ties. The reason that bounds inhabitants in their home
country is therefore their good standard of living and social ties.
73. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The model presented in this paper is based on the theory of motivation
introduced in 1950s by Abraham H. Maslow. In the book "Motivation and
personality10" Maslow presented ￿ve sets of human needs that drive human
behaviour. These needs have been organized into hierarchy of relative
dominance according to their appearance in human life.
First type of needs that ensure survival of individual are physiological
needs such as hunger, thirst, appetite for some speci￿c food (salt, sugar,
vitamins...), sexual desire etc. In case that all needs a man can have are
unsatis￿ed, the individual is above all dominated by these needs. All human
capacities such as intelligence, memory and physical abilities serve only to
one purpose - to satisfy physiological needs.
One of the main purposes of society is to ensure low incidence of phys-
iological emergencies. Hence, situations when people starve or thirst are
quite scarce in todays normally functioning peaceful societies. The ques-
tion that arises is what motivates people when their physiological needs are
satis￿ed.
Immediately after the physiological needs are grati￿ed to some extent,
other needs emerge that govern the organism. And when these new needs
are satis￿ed, other (higher) needs come out once again. According to
Maslow, safety needs are directly superior to physiological ones. Into the
category of safety needs we may include desire for security, stability, de-
pendency, protection, freedom from fear, from anxiety and chaos, need for
structure, order, law, limits and so on11. Similarly to physiological needs,
safety requirements completely dominate human organism in case the lower
needs are satis￿ed and safety needs are not. Individual is seeking safety
and stability and uses all abilities to achieve it. Manifestation of safety
needs is for example general preference for familiar, known things rather
than unfamiliar, obscure and unknown ones.
When the above mentioned needs are relatively well grati￿ed, belong-
ingness and love needs emerge. And the whole process of satisfaction starts
over again. People long for friends, spouses, children, wish to be integral
part of their family, clique, tribe, nation etc. We can observe unfavourable
implications of loosing one￿ s roots, one￿ s territory, one￿ s neighbourhood.
The two highest layers of human motivation are the esteem needs and
the need for self-actualization. Esteem needs are demonstrated as longing
for self-respect and reputation, the desire to be recognized and appreciated
by others. People need to have the feeling of usefulness and of freedom and
independence. Self-actualization means the need to do what an individual
personally is "￿tted for", what he is talented for.
10Maslow (1954)
11Maslow (1954)
84. MOTIVATION THEORY AND MIGRATION
Let us now discuss how Maslow￿ s motivational theory conforms to mi-
gration behaviour. We have ￿ve stages of ful￿llment of needs that the
individual can experience. The ￿rst situation is when physiological needs
are not grati￿ed. Then the only desire is to achieve additional sources of
nourishment. Individual will move into another location provided that this
step decreases hunger or thirst.
Second, the individual has enough food but lives in unsafe, threatening
surroundings where his life is endangered or the environment is chaotic and
unpredictable. Then he or she will move to another location if the level of
safety, predictability and order grows through such a step. Nevertheless,
this move will not be done if the new safe place does not provide enough
sources to guarantee grati￿cation of physiological needs.
On the other hand, safety needs are an important factor binding people
to their native land. The territory they are living in is familiar, majority
of people they are dealing with are known, they have social status that is
connected with some duties and rights, they can communicate with other
people using their native language, they are well oriented in cultural cus-
toms and they know their rights and acceptable ways of behaviour. Unfa-
miliar and sometimes hostile environment in destination country disturbs
safety and stability requirement and thus decreases bene￿t from migration.
Third, both safety and physiological needs are ful￿lled but the individ-
ual su⁄ers from absence of family, friends or colleagues. Social needs may
encourage migration especially in cases when some of the family members
already moved to new destination looking for work or safety and they left
their families behind. The reuni￿cation of families is known as a fundamen-
tal stimulus of migration ￿ ows. On the other hand, the same strong force
that motivates people to follow their relatives to foreign country inclines
them to stay in their native land, surrounded by their families, friends,
neighbours, working colleagues and their own nation.
Fourth factor that might motivate people to migration is their longing
for esteem, reputation or glory. People will move if this step is followed by
improved social status or attainment of fame. But moving may result in
loss of hardly achieved position in social network as well.
The last motive for movement may, according to Maslow￿ s theory, be
the desire for self-actualization ￿the tendency to exert own talents and
geniuses.
When a person decides to move, he must consider consequences of this
step. There are many arrangements how to proceed and accordingly to
disrupt or conversely attain level of ful￿llment of social and safety needs.
Movement to another country will disrupt safety and order in person￿ s life
more that movement within one￿ s own country or, at least, to culturally
close environment. Nevertheless, the violation might be less serious for
people who either know somebody in the new destination or who are well
9acquainted with the new surroundings. This may depend on education,
language abilities, accessibility of information etc. The existence of eth-
nic cluster in destination may importantly decrease social loss caused by
migration.
In our analysis we will simplify Maslow￿ s approach and employ only
three motives. Furthermore, we assume that there are only two levels of
decision making12. At the ￿rst level only physiological needs are taken into
account. When an individual reaches some threshold level of saturation
of physiological needs, safety and social needs occur. If wage exceeds the
threshold an individual seeks to secure all needs simultaneously.
The analysis of the two levels of decision making allows us to compare
migration patterns in poor and developed countries and explain di⁄erent
migration behaviour of their citizens.
5. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
Following section is devoted to the description of the model. In the
model, an agent is equivalent to individual whose characteristics were de-
scribed above. There are presented three models that incorporate three
factors in￿ uencing utility of agents. First model takes into consideration
only physiological needs and supposes that they are not satis￿ed for any
income level. Hence the only interest of every agent is to maximize wage13.
Second model adds need of safety that is represented by higher utility levels
achieved in home environment compared to other regions. With number of
periods spent in foreign environment additional utility acquired thanks to
living in home environment gradually decreases. However, stability needs
are activated only if wage exceeds certain threshold level. Third model
examines situation when agents￿utility is positively in￿ uenced by wage,
safety and proximity of socially valuable individuals.
An environment the agents are situated in composes of three regions.
Each region has 20 times 20 cells and is convoluted into the torus shape14.
Toruses represent three regions with various wage levels. The ground for
torus shape is non-existence of borders on its surface. The presence of
borders might bias results because when placed in border cell the agent
would have only ￿ve neighbouring cells instead of Moore neighbourhood15
the other agents do have. This would decrease agent￿ s potential utility
from social contacts16.
12Empirical ￿ndings con￿rm the existence of some hierarchical arrangement of human
needs but there still does not exist clear evidence about the exact structure of the
pyramid. See Alderfer (1969).
13We take wage as an instrument that allows agents to ful￿l physiological needs (ac-
quire food and beverages).
14see Figure 1.
15Moore neighbourhood is de￿ned as eight neighbouring cells on grid.
16In reality, social environment has no such boundary positions.
10Figure 4: Torus




; i = A;B;C
where Wi is prede￿ned wage parameter and nit is number of agents present
in region i at time t.
There are 399 agents. At the beginning of simulation 133 agents are
placed in their home region and their exact position is determined ran-
domly. It is possible to start di⁄erent runs with identical initial distribution
of agents.
5.1. Simple Model
The ￿rst model is based on assumption that agents are maximizing
their utility only through maximization of their wage. Such situation oc-
curs when an agent has not ful￿lled physiological needs. In the model we
simplify the problem of hunger-satisfaction into wage maximization task.




where wit is wage an agent receives in region he is present in at time t.
Agents have perfect information about their utility in each cell and choose
cell with highest utility. In case of equal utilities cell is chosen randomly
unless one of these cells is current location. In that case no movement is
made.
5.2. Model with safety needs
In the second model we assume that presence in home region is valuable
because safety needs are being ful￿lled. However, if wage is below threshold
value only physiological needs are taken into account and only wage is
maximized. Utility function of agent j at time t is de￿ned as
17Labour supply e⁄ect of immigration leads to a lower wage in receiving region. For





> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
(1 + wit)1￿￿(1 + b
j
t)￿
if agent is in home region
(1 + wit)1￿￿
otherwise
for wit > T
u
j
t(w;b) = wit for wit 5 T
where wit is wage level in region the agent j is present in, ￿ 2 h0;1i is
parameter of utility function indicating sensitivity to safety needs. T is
threshold value of wage. For wage lower than T an agent is interested only
in wage maximization18. For wage higher than T agent appreciates also
the fact that he can spend his time in home region (safety needs activated).






where ￿j is number of periods agent j spent abroad. We assume that
additional utility gained from living in home region decreases with time
spent abroad.
5.3. Model with safety and social needs
In model with safety and social needs agent appreciates living in home
region as well as direct contact with other agents that are socially valuable
to him (social needs are activated).










t￿1 ￿ ￿ if k is not present in j￿ s Moore neighbourhood in period t
s
jk
t = 1 for s
jk
t￿1 + ￿ > 1
s
jk
t = 0 for s
jk
t￿1 ￿ ￿ < 0
s
jk
0 = 0 for all agents
where t = 1;2;3::: is time variable and ￿ 2 h0;1i is coe¢ cient that de-
termines speed of establishment and abandonment of social ties between
agents. Utility function is again speci￿ed separately for di⁄erent wage lev-
18In Maslow￿ s approach the physiological needs are not ful￿lled and hence all other
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if agent is in home region




for wit > T
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t + ::: + s
j8
t and j1;j2:::;j8 are cells in Moore neigh-
bourhood of agent j. Parameter ￿ 2 h0;1i expresses sensitivity to social
variable. T is physiological threshold. Below this wage level of agents are
interested only in wage level.
First period in which agents make their decision about migration may
be postponed (to allow them to create social ties with other agents).
6. COMPUTER SIMULATIONS
To be able to compare results of di⁄erent models published in this pa-
per, we start simulations mentioned here with the same initial distribution
showed in Figure 5. There are 3 regions A, B and C marked as Grid: A,
Grid: B and Grid: C. Wages in regions A, B and C are indicated below
each region together with number of agents of each colour19 present in
given region.
Figure 5: Initial distribution of agents
The agents decide one after another and distribution is depicted when
all of them made their decision in given period.
19Black agents have region A as a home region, grey agents have region B as home
region and white agents have region C as home region.
136.1. Simple model
We begin simulations with following wage parameters:
WA = 250 WB = 500 WC = 750
Within ￿rst period 136 agents moved from their home region to another20
and wages equalized in all three regions. See Figure 6.
Figure 6: Simple model - stable state
If agents are not able to ￿nd stable state because their number is
integral ￿gure, multiple equilibria appear. This is the case e.g. for initial
wage parameters WA = 100, WB = 201 and WC = 302. See Figure 7.
Figure 7: Simple model - development of wages in case of multiple
equilibria
For all initial wage parameters WA, WB and WC, the ￿nal wage levels will
be either equalized or reach multiple equilibria state for the simple wage
maximization model.
6.2. Model with safety needs
Figure 8 depicts stable distribution in case that safety needs are added
to the model and wage parameters are set to WA = 250, WB = 500;
WC = 750 and ￿ = 0:3. Threshold T = 0.
20A ! B: 17, A !C: 50, B ! C: 43, C ! B: 26
14Figure 8: Model with safety needs - stable state
We can see that for coe¢ cient ￿ = 0:3, wages are not equal in stable state.
Stable state was achieved after two periods when 56 agents moved from
both regions A and B to region C in the ￿rst run (highest wage was still in
region C). In the following step all grey agents moved back to their native
region whereas some black agents migrated to region C. When compared
with simple model, the addition of safety needs caused re-emigration of
grey agents to their home region and hence lower diversity of agents in
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Figure 9: Model with safety needs - wage levels in stable state for
di⁄erent alphas
Figure 9 summarizes ￿nal wages in all three regions for various alphas,
wage parameters WA = 250, WB = 500; WC = 750 and T = 0. We see
that for ￿ ￿ 0:7 the in￿ uence of safety needs is so strong that no migration
occurs at all. For wage parameters WA = 250, WB = 300 and WC = 350
is this breaking point ￿ = 0:4.
On condition that we employ threshold T = 3:5, the dynamics of the
system changes as well as ￿nal allocation of agents showed in Figure 10.
15Figure 10: Model with safety needs - T = 3.5
It took 13 (instead of 2) periods to ￿nd stable state and there were totally
778 migration moves made. Final wage levels exceeded threshold T = 3:5 in
all three regions. With the exception of ￿rst two periods only black agents
migrated and in￿ uenced ￿nal stable state. Because agents were leaving
region with wage below 3:5 and headed for region with higher wages, ￿nal
wage in region A was above given threshold and wage levels were less varied
than for simulation without threshold.
6.3. Model with safety and social needs
6.3.1. ￿ set to 0
Let us ￿rst consider the case when ￿ = 0 hence agents￿utility is not
in￿ uenced by the region they stay in (safety needs are not included). The
decision of agents depends on the value of coe¢ cient ￿ and P - number
of periods the ￿rst decision is postponed for. Let us compare stable states
for agents beginning their decision in the ￿rst period (P = 0) and after
ten periods (P = 10) (Figure 11). Wage parameters are again WA = 250,
WB = 500 and WC = 750, parameter ￿ = 0:3, speed of establishment of
social ties ￿ = 0:1 and T = 0.
16Figure 11: Model with social needs - stable state in case of P=0 (top) and
P=10 (bottom)
In simulation with the ￿rst decision made in the initial period 85 agents
moved in the ￿rst period and their migration equalized wages in regions.
We can see that as against the model with safety needs (Figure 10) 18 grey
agents ￿nd it bene￿cial to stay in region C. This is caused by fact that
in the ￿rst period social ties are so weak, that agents are able to equalize
wages and then they do not have any motive to move further because social
ties from the ￿rst period are equalized by new social ties established in new
location and they gradually strengthen.
Postponement of ￿rst decision until tenth period led to slightly lower
migration in the ￿rst decision making period (tenth period in the real
time). Number of migrating agents in periods 10 to 15 were 79, 23, 9, 1,
0. It is interesting that in the ￿rst decision-making period so many black
agents moved to region C that wage in region A rose to 4.098 that was the
highest wage level of all regions. The reason may be the joint movement of
socially tied agents. Agents maybe followed some of their socially valuable
agents that already moved when wage advantage of region C was important.
Stable state wages are slightly di⁄erent in the three regions for 10 period
postponement.
postponed for 0 periods wA = 3:731 wB = 3:731 wC = 3:731
10 periods wA = 3:731 wB = 3:787 wC = 3:694
17Figure 12: Model with social needs - wage levels in stable state for
di⁄erent betas and postponement 0 and 10 periods
For identical values of coe¢ cient ￿ higher variation in wages appears when
the ￿rst decision is potponed (see Figure 12). Postponement enables agents
to establish social ties. Hence agents in whose Moore neighbourhood other
agents are present are less motivated to move to region with high wages.
In case of movement, contribution of socially valuable neighbours would be
lost.
Figure 13: Model with social needs - T = 3,5, ￿rst decision postponed for
10 periods
Let us now discuss identical simulation with threshold T = 3:5. and
postponement P = 10. Migration ￿ ows intensi￿ed - 158 moves were made
in comparison with 112 in case of zero threshold. In stable state highest
wage level was achieved in region A whereas without threshold highest wage
was in region B. (This is not a rule for all initial states.)
18Figure 14: Model with social needs - wages in stable state for di⁄erent
betas, T = 3.5, P = 10
Figure 14 shows simulations with threshold 3:5 for 10 period post-
ponement. Maximal wage di⁄erence is achieved for ￿ = 1. Wages are
wA = 3:521, wB = 3:731 and wC = 3:807. Compared to zero threshold
case (wA = 1:865, wB = 3:731 and wC = 5:597 for ￿ = 1) the existence of
threshold leads to signi￿cant wage equalization. The higher is the threshold














T = 0 T = 3,5
Figure 15: Model with social needs - number of moves needed to achieve
stable state for di⁄erent betas, P = 10; T = 0 and T = 3.5
It is also intriguing to observe number of moves needed to achieve stable
state. In case of zero postponement agents reach stable state after one
period for both T = 0 and T = 3:5. In case of 10 period postponement it
takes usually more than two periods to ￿nd stable state and for T = 3:5
and for ￿ equal 0.9 and 1 the stable state was not achieved even after 500
19periods. Figure 15 shows number of moves needed to reach stable state for
10 period postponement.
6.3.2. Safety and social needs included
Let us now discuss model with both safety and social needs active.
Wage parameters are again set to WA = 250, WB = 500 and WC = 750
and coe¢ cients ￿ = 0:3 and ￿ = 0:3. Speed of establishment of social ties
￿ = 0:1 and threshold￿ T = 0 and postponemnt P = 10 (see Figure 16).
Figure 16: Model with safety and social needs - P=10, T=0
When decision was postponed until tenth period, only 8 agents migrated
in this period, followed by 1, 1, 3 and 5 agents in subsequent periods.
Then the system reached stable state with zero migration. Wage level in
region B remains unchanged. We can see that combination of social ties
created within ￿rst ten periods and safety needs leads to some kind of
"conservatism" - agents are less mobile and less willing to leave their home
region. Agents from region with lowest wage moved to the region with
highest wages.
Figure 17: Model with safety and social needs - T = 3.5, P = 10
20For threshold T = 3:5 and P = 10 (Figure 17) an intriguing situation
occured that we already saw in Figure 15. Here again stable state was not
reached even for 1000 periods elapsed21. Wages stabilized at the same level
as in model with safety needs and T = 3:5, they were less equalized than
in model with social needs and T = 3;5.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Migration literature often mentions social aspects of life as highly in-
￿ uential as concerns migration decision-making. Social costs of movement
and, on the other hand, bene￿ts from supportive ethnic clusters in desti-
nation area are frequently noticed. There are many studies dealing with
social networks in destination area but social costs of movement are only
rarely included into analysis. Our approach allowed us to examine impact
of social ties on migration ￿ ows.
What is more, our model re￿ ects the fact known and recognized by
psychologists but scarcely used in economics. That is general preference
for known, familiar and predictable environment. In case of migration we
can express this psychological phenomenon as general preference of living
in native country compared to life abroad.
In comparison with other migration models we are able to explicitly
work with preference for known, familiar environment and appreciation
of proximity of friends, family and other socially tied individuals. These
factors are in majority of models hidden under the all inclusive term "bar-
riers". In fact, to disclose real factors in￿ uencing migration may be crucial
for policy measures aimed at migration.
The model leads to following conclusions:
1. If agents include safety and social needs into decision making then
wages in all regions either exceed minimal physiological threshold or
are equalized in stable state.
2. If agents include safety needs into decision making then wages may
remain unequalised in stable state.
3. If agents include social needs into decision making then wages may
remain unequalised in stable state.
4. The more important are social and safety needs, the lower conver-
gence of wage levels due to migration occurs.
In the real world this would mean that:
1. People should move from countries where wages are below physiolog-
ical threshold.
21Migration ￿ows settled on 2 agents making their moves in each period.
212. If people appreciate living in home country compared to foreign coun-
try and their income is higher then physiological minimum then mi-
gration ￿ ows might stop even if the wage di⁄erences between states
(regions) exist.
3. If people appreciate proximity of people they well know and their
income is higher then physiological minimum then migration ￿ ows
might stop even if the wage di⁄erences between states (regions) exist.
The implications for real world economies are quite apparent. First, if
countries provide social security bene￿ts above the physiological threshold,
people in their decisions take into account also other than economic factors.
Hence, people are less mobile, less willing to move from current location
due to economic reasons.
Second, real migration ￿ ows depend on individual valuation of social
ties and safety. These features might be largely determined by cultural
habits and customs. Therefore, identical wage di⁄erences might induce
di⁄erent migration ￿ ows in various regions.
Third, wage di⁄erences may persist even though no barriers to migra-
tion exist. The way to induce mobility of people then lies in reduction of
native country preference through e.g. language education or support of
international social ties.
The model o⁄ers many ways for further use and also many possible
re￿nements. First, ￿nding of real-world coe¢ cients for the model might
be quite demanding but worthwhile task. The initial distribution might be
enriched by prede￿ned social ties (substituting family relations) and at the
same time, some percentage share of agents might be placed in other than
home region simulating already existing ethnic clusters. Another possible
improvement is identi￿cation of each particular agent that would allow us
to observe how agents in socially tied groups react and behave. Finally,
the implementation of some kind of dynamising element in the developing
economies could enrich our knowledge further.
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